




















Previous studies have examined the family gap in pay – the differential in hourly wages 
between women with children and women without children - at a point in time, across groups, or 
across countries, but we know little about whether, and how, the family gap has changed over 
time. We provide new evidence on this question for the United States from 1977 to 2007, using 
data from the 1978, 1988, 1998, and 2008 March Current Population Survey and a consistent set 
of methods to adjust for selection into motherhood and employment. We find that for women 
overall, after accounting for selection into motherhood, the penalty to motherhood in 2007 is 
similar to 1977. However, the results differ by race/ethnicity, education level, and marital status; 
most importantly, we find that the magnitude of the family gap has declined in recent decades for 
married mothers, but increased for never married mothers. 
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The family gap in pay – the differential in hourly wages between women with children 
and women without children – has drawn considerable attention from economists and 
sociologists. A series of increasingly rigorous studies have examined the magnitude of the gap at 
particular points in time, as well as disparities in the gap across groups and across countries. Yet, 
we know surprisingly little about whether, and how, the family gap in pay has changed over 
time.  
 We provide new evidence on this question for the U.S. over the period 1977 to 2007, 
using comparable data on nationally representative samples of women from the 1978, 1988, 
1998, and 2008 rounds of the March Current Population Survey (CPS) and applying to each year 
of data the same methods to adjust for bias associated with selection into motherhood and 
selection into employment. To briefly preview the results, we find that for women overall, 
accounting for selection into motherhood, the penalty to motherhood in 2007 is similar to what it 
was in 1977. This overall conclusion is unchanged even after taking changes in part-time 
employment, occupation, and industry into account.  
Results are not uniform, however. We find persistent family penalties for Non-Hispanic 
White women and Black women, but not for Hispanic women. Results by education level also 
reveal considerable heterogeneity. Most strikingly, we find no significant family penalties at any 
year for those with less than a high school education, in contrast to the other education groups for 
whom significant penalties are seen in all four years. Finally, examining trends by marital status, 
we find a marked decline in the family gap for married mothers over the past two decades, a 
period when married fathers’ involvement in child care and household work has been increasing. 
In contrast, we find a sharp increase in the magnitude of the family gap for never married 
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mothers in the 1980s and 1990s, a period when welfare reforms pushed many low-skilled single 
mothers into the labor market.  
1. Prior Research on the Family Gap in the United States 
One of the earliest explicit estimates of the differential in hourly pay between women 
with children and women without children appeared in Women’s Quest for Economic Equality, 
by Victor Fuchs (1988). Using Census data from 1960 and CPS data from 1986, Fuchs estimated 
that women with children earn 7-9% less than childless women. Researchers in the 1990s found 
gaps of similar magnitude, with mothers’ hourly wages trailing those of non-mothers by roughly 
10-15% (Sanders Korenman and David Neumark 1992; Jane Waldfogel 1997).   
Studies since the 1990s have estimated increasingly sophisticated models, and examined 
differences in the family gap between groups.1  Many studies use the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY) or Young Women (NLSYW), employing both pooled OLS as well as 
fixed effects models (Hiromi Taniguchi 1999; Michelle Budig and Paula England 2001; Deborah 
Anderson, Melissa Binder, and Kate Krause 2002; Charles Baum II 2002; Sarah Avellar and 
Pamela Smock 2003; Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes and Jean Kimmel 2008) to analyze the effect of 
children on women’s wages. Concerned that fertility may be endogenous to the wage equation (if 
lower-earning women select into childbirth or if women time childbirth to coincide with periods 
of slow wage growth), some researchers have made use of instrumental variables (IV) models to 
gauge the causal effect of children on wages (Sanders Korenman and David Neumark 1992; 
                                                          
1 There are also many studies that examine the family gap in other countries, and across countries 
(see e.g. Erin Todd 2001; Susan Harkness and Jane Waldfogel 2003; Wendy Sigle-Rushton and 
Jane Waldfogel 2007; Markus Gangl and Andrea Ziefle 2009).  
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Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes and Jean Kimmel 2008; Katie Winder 2008).  Researchers have 
frequently used Heckman selection correction models to correct for selection into employment 
(Sanders Korenman and David Neumark 1992; Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes and Jean Kimmel 
2005; Rebecca Glauber 2007; Markus Gangl and Andrea Ziefle 2009) since the women most 
likely to be affected by the motherhood wage penalty are also more likely to remain out of the 
labor force, thereby biasing down the magnitude of the wage penalty in uncorrected models.  The 
use of increasingly sophisticated models has improved the rigor of research in this area, but has 
also made it difficult to compare estimates across studies.  
Over the last decade, researchers have increasingly looked at variation in the motherhood 
penalty between groups.2 Studies have obtained mixed results as to how the motherhood wage 
penalty varies by education and skill level. Some researchers have found the penalty to be 
smaller (Hiromi Taniguchi 1999; Erin Todd 2001) or even absent (Deborah Anderson, Melissa 
Binder, and Kate Krause 2003; Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes and Jean Kimmel 2005;) at the 
highest end of the educational attainment distribution and larger in the middle (Anderson et al 
2003, Todd 2001).  Contrary to these findings, other researchers have found no penalties for the 
least educated mothers (Deborah Anderson, Melissa Binder, and Kate Krause 2002) and the 
largest penalties for women with the highest skill levels (Elizabeth Ty Wilde, Lily Batchelder, 
and David Ellwood 2010). With regard to differences in the motherhood penalty by race and 
ethnicity, there is some evidence that Hispanic mothers face no penalty (Rebecca Glauber 2007) 
or smaller penalties than other groups (Michelle Budig and Paula England 2001); Black mothers 
also tend to face smaller penalties (Jane Waldfogel 1997; Rebecca Glauber 2007; but see also 
                                                          
2 See also recent review by Margaret Gough and Mary Noonan (2013).  
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Deborah Anderson, Melissa Binder, and Kate Krause 2003). With regard to variation by marital 
status, some evidence has linked marriage to a larger motherhood penalty (Michelle Budig and 
Paula England 2001; Rebecca Glauber 2007; David Loughran and Julie Zissimopoulos 2009).3  
Few studies have examined changes in the family gap over time. Jane Waldfogel (1998a) 
presents parallel analyses of data from the NLSY and NLSYW in 1980 and 1991 (as well as 
more limited data from the CPS for prime age workers in 1978, 1988, and 1994) and concludes 
that the family gap was rising over that period, even as the overall gender pay gap was 
narrowing. Sarah Avellar and Pamela Smock (2003) also use the NLSYW (1975-1985) and the 
NLSY (1986-1998) and find a 3% motherhood wage penalty in both time periods.  
In this paper, we examine the family gap over a longer period of time – using data from 
1977 to 2007.4 To assure comparability over time, as detailed in the next section, we use a 
consistent source of data, the March CPS, and apply the same methods in each year to adjust our 
estimates for selection into motherhood and employment. We examine the role played by part-
                                                          
3  Michelle Budig and Melissa Hodges (2010) included interactions of marital status with the 
number of children at different income quantiles and found that never married women earned lower 
penalties (compared to both the married and the divorced/separated) in the bottom quantiles only, 
while ever-married women at the top earnings quantiles earned a motherhood bonus. See also 
Alexandra Killewald and Jonathan Bearak (2014) for a re-analysis using unconditional quantile 
regressions and the original researchers’ response in Budig and Hodges (2014). 
4  In unpublished work, Rebecca Glauber (2013) carries out a similar analysis for the period 1980-
2010. She finds the motherhood penalty increased for unmarried mothers and decreased for 
married mothers over this period.   
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time employment, occupation, and industry and how that may have changed over time. And, we 
examine the extent to which the family gap differs by race/ethnicity, education level, and marital 
status, and how that variation may have changed over time. 
The period we examine is an interesting one, because it is a period when the overall 
gender gap in pay declined. At the end of the 1970s, women’s earnings averaged 62% of men’s, 
but by 2008 this figure had risen to 80%. The most pronounced decrease in the gender gap was 
for women in the 25-to-34 age range, whose median weekly earnings relative to men’s rose from 
68% in 1979 to 89% in 2008 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009a, b). There was substantial 
variation in the trends in the gender gap by race and ethnicity, but all groups of women gained 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2008).  However, we do not know if these trends in the gender gap 
were accompanied by comparable changes in the family gap.  
2. Data and Methods  
Our data are drawn from the March Current Population Survey (CPS), a nationally 
representative survey of the non-institutionalized population in the U.S.5  The CPS is the source 
of official labor force statistics and is administered monthly. We use the March CPS, which 
provides retrospective data on earnings in the prior year as well as comprehensive data on 
individual characteristics and family demographics.  
We use data from the March 1978, 1988, 1998, and 2008 surveys, which provide 
information on earnings in 1977, 1987, 1997, and 2007 respectively. Our selection of these years 
is guided by the fact that they are a decade apart and occur at roughly similar points in the 
                                                          
5  Data used in this research is from Miriam King et al (2010), publicly available at 




economic cycle (National Bureau of Economic Research 2010).  We end our analysis with 2007 
because of the Great Recession which occurred immediately afterwards.6  
 Our primary analysis sample in each year consists of women age 25 to 44 years who 
worked in the prior year and reported some income from employment.7 Restricting analysis to 
prime-age workers is standard and ensures that estimates are not affected by including younger 
people who may still be enrolled in school or older people who may be starting to withdraw from 
the labor market.8 We retain in our sample all types of workers except the self-employed (who 
represent 3-4% of our sample each year) and unpaid family workers (who represent less than 1% 
in each year’s sample of working women).9  
                                                          
6   We were not able to use data from 1968 March CPS because it does not include information on 
weeks or hours worked in the past year which is necessary to construct hourly wages. 
7 This represents 67% of women in the 25-44 age group in 1977, 78% in 1987, 79% in 1997 and 
78% in 2007. See also Appendix A for sample divided by motherhood status.  
8 The March CPS contains data on children in the household, but not children ever born; thus 
among older women without children in the home, we cannot distinguish between those who did 
not ever have children and those who have children no longer living at home. We provide 
supplementary estimates where we test the sensitivity of our results to including younger or older 
workers. See Appendix C. 
9 We carried out supplementary analyses to test the sensitivity of our results to including the self-




Our focal outcome variable is the natural log of hourly wages. We calculate the wage in 
each year by first creating a variable to denote the total hours worked last year (product of weeks 
worked last year and usual hours worked per week last year) and then dividing the annual wage 
and salary income from last year by this variable to arrive at the hourly wage. We adjust wages 
for inflation using the annual average CPI-U (as provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 
Malik Crawford and Jonathan Church 2014: Table 24. “Historical Consumer Price Index for All 
Urban Consumers (CPI-U): U. S. city average, all items”). Unless otherwise noted, reported 
wage figures are in 2011 dollars. We exclude women who reported wages less than 45% of the 
federal minimum wage for the year (this proportion is roughly similar across the four years, 0.9-
2.6% of working women).10 After excluding those not working or with wages below the cut-off, 
our final wage samples represent 60% of women age 25-44 in the CPS in 1977, 71% in 1987 and 
about 72% in both 1997 and 2007 (details in Appendix A). 
 Our key independent variable is a dummy variable for motherhood, which we define 
based on the presence of own children under the age of 18 in the household.11 Thus in all models, 
the reference category is women with no children under age 18 in the household. We refer to this 
                                                          
10  The CPS data is top-coded so we did not have to exclude any women for high wages.   
11 We also estimated models allowing the effects of motherhood to vary by the number of 




latter group as non-mothers.12 The proportion of mothers to non-mothers is roughly similar 
across the four years, with 61-67% mothers and 33-39% non-mothers.  
 There are several challenges to estimating the causal effect of children on women’s 
wages.  The first is selection into motherhood. Women who have children may differ from other 
women in ways that also affect their wages; if so, the failure to control for those differences will 
lead to biased estimates of the “effect” of children on women’s pay.  
The standard approach to addressing such selection in the family gap literature is to 
estimate multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models that include controls for the 
types of characteristics thought to affect both motherhood and wages – characteristics such as 
age, education, race and ethnicity, and so on. We adopt this approach in our first set of models, 
estimating the following equation(s) separately for each year:  
Ln(Wage)i = β0+ β1Motheri + ∑βjXji+εi                                                                  (1)  
where Ln(Wage) is the natural log of hourly wage (in 2011 dollars) for the i-th 
respondent; Mother is a dummy variable denoting whether a woman is a mother or not (as 
defined above); X is the covariate vector and includes j demographic, family, and human capital 
variables (age and age squared, and dummies denoting educational attainment, marital status, 
and race and ethnicity). We use four categories for educational attainment: less than high school, 
                                                          
12  As mentioned, some women who we code as non-mothers may have had children in the past. 
Including such women among the non-mothers will attenuate differences between the mother and 
non-mother groups and lead us to under-estimate the magnitude of the family gap. 
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high school graduate, some college, and college graduate.13 We use three categories for marital 
status: married, previously married, and never married. And we use the following categories for 
race and ethnicity: non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, and Hispanic.14  β1 is our 
coefficient of interest in Eq.1 and provides an estimate of the percentage difference in wages 
between mothers and non-mothers in the given year.  
A more refined approach to addressing selection, now quite commonly used although 
until recently not on this topic, is the estimation of propensity score models.15 These models take 
                                                          
13 Before 1992, information on educational attainment was collected by asking respondents their 
highest grade of school or year of college completed. Since 1992, the CPS has asked respondents 
their highest degree or diploma attained. This change led to some issues of comparability which 
we address following methods detailed by David Jaeger (1997, 1998). 
14 The race variable has gone through several changes over the years (Mary Bowler, Randy Ilg, 
Stephen Miller, and Ed Robinson 2003). We have created a race variable that is comparable across 
years and combined that with a Hispanic variable to create three race/ethnic categories. We 
combine the “Other” category (about 2.5-8% across the four years) into the Non-Hispanic White 
category. This allows us to get significantly better matched samples in our inverse probability of 
treatment weighted models.  
15 Marianne Simonsen and Lars Skipper (2006) use propensity score matching in a Danish sample 
(cross-sectional data from 1997). Miriam Beblo, Stefan Bender, and Elke Wolf (2008) use 
propensity score matching on German employment data. Most recently, Tarja Viitanen (2014) uses 
propensity score matching on longitudinal data from the UK’s National Child Development Study. 
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the same kinds of observed characteristics into account and adjust estimates for the likelihood of 
being in the “treatment” group (in this case, mothers). A major assumption underlying this 
approach is the ignorability of treatment assignment or conditional independence; that is, 
conditional on a set of observed covariates, the outcome is independent of treatment assignment. 
The propensity score of each woman is the probability of being a mother, conditional on 
observed pre-treatment covariates.16 To obtain this, we first estimate a binary probit model with 
being a mother as a function of the set of confounding covariates that we believe affect selection 
into motherhood (as well as wages); these variables are either fixed over time or are assumed to 
be measured pre-treatment.  
Motheri = β0 + ∑βjXji+ +ui                (Selection  Eq. 1) 
where, Mother is the binary treatment (Mother or Non-Mother); Xj represents a vector of co-
variates that determine selection into motherhood and includes but is not limited to all covariates 
in the corresponding regression equation.  
The predicted values from this probit regression give us propensity of being a mother. 
We use this propensity score to re-weight the sample using the method of inverse probability of 
                                                          
To our knowledge, no previous study in this literature has used the Inverse Probability of 
Treatment Weighting (IPTW) technique to correct for selection into motherhood. 
16 “If potential outcomes are independent of treatment status conditional on a multivariate covariate 
vector X, then the potential outcomes are independent of treatment status conditional on a 
multivariate scalar function of covariates, the propensity score” (Paul Rosenbaum and Donald 
Rubin 1983, 1984, 1985) .  
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treatment weighting (IPTW) 17. After re-weighting, we test the covariate balance to ensure that 
there are no significant differences in means between treatment and control groups across all 
covariates.18 We then run the adjusted regression (equation 1) using the re-weighted sample, 
which allows us to place more weight on those non-mothers who had a higher propensity score. 
 A common limitation of both standard OLS and IPTW regression models is that they 
adjust only for observable differences between groups. There may still be unobservable 
differences between women who become mothers and those who do not. For example, the 
                                                          
17 Using the predicted values from the probit regression (Selection equation 1), i.e. the estimated 
propensity score, p, we create inverse probability of treatment weights as follows: 1/p if 
Mother=1 and 1/ (1-p) if Mother=0. (see for instance, Jared Lunceford and Marie Davidian 2004 
for a discussion of the theoretical properties of the IPTW estimator). 
18 We modeled treatment (mother) in a variety of ways, using higher order terms as well as 
interaction terms in the selection equation to achieve covariate balance following standard 
diagnostic procedures for IPTW analysis (Stephen Cole and Miguel Hernan 2008; Stephen Morgan 
and Jennifer Todd 2008; Peter Austin 2011) and implemented it using the Stata module psmatch2 
(Edwin Leuven and Barbara Sianesi 2003). Other than the main covariates, we have tried two-way, 
three-way, and four-way interactions among them and inclusion of the following variables—
region, whether residing in metropolitan area, nativity and citizenship status, in order to find 
models where each covariate is balanced.  For our main results (Table 1), IPTW selection models 
are the best fitting models (using Akaike’s Information Criteria, AIC and Schwartz’s Bayesian 
Information Criteria, BIC) among such fully balanced models for each year. (See Balance Statistics 
in Appendix D) 
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former group may be less career-oriented. If so, even estimates from fully controlled or inverse 
probability of treatment weighted regression models could still be biased. However, this 
limitation cannot easily be addressed without an experiment that randomly assigns some women 
to motherhood (or a natural experiment or instrument that does something similar).  
A second challenge to causal estimation is selection into employment. Women, and 
particularly those with children, do not always participate in the labor market, and thus at any 
single point in time, the wage sample will contain a selected group of wage-earners. If that 
selection is correlated with wages (e.g. if the mothers who work are those who face the smallest 
wage penalties), estimates that do not take it into account will be biased. The standard method in 
the family gap literature to address such bias is the use of a Heckman selection correction model 
(James Heckman 1979) and we apply that method here as well.  
Recall that our wage sample is composed of women who worked (and had valid wages) 
in the previous year. Going back to our regression equation, Eq.1, we note that it is estimated 
only for this sample. To correct for selection into the wage sample, we need a variable that 
predicts this but is otherwise uncorrelated with the wage. We assume that the natural log of other 
household income (OHY, defined as the difference between total annual household income and 
the respondent’s own annual income from wages) influences the woman’s decision to work, but 
that once a woman is in the labor force, OHY has no impact on her wages. To correct for 
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selection into employment, we estimate the effect of motherhood on wages in a two-step process 
by first estimating the probability for a mother to be employed through a probit equation.19  
Selection Si = β0+β1Ln_OHY + ∑βjXji+ui -----------------------------(Selection Eq.2),  
A woman is selected into our wage sample only if Si>0. OHY is other household income as 
defined above and X is the same vector of covariates as in the wage regression equations. 
While sample selection correction models have been widely used in this literature, they 
have limitations. They may not address all the factors associated with selection into employment 
and in particular those that are not observable. In addition, they rely on assumptions about the 
exogeneity of the predictors used in the selection regression (in our case, other household 
income), and their results may be sensitive to which predictors are included.20  A further point to 
note is the quantity that they estimate – the wages that mothers would receive if they were in the 
labor market. While this is an interesting estimate, it is not the main estimate that we are 
concerned with here – which is the wages mothers do receive, relative to non-mothers. For this 
reason, we place less weight on the sample selection corrected estimates than on our IPTW 
estimates. 
As is evident from this discussion, there are limitations to the methods we use to correct 
for selection into both motherhood and employment. However, for the purposes of this analysis, 
                                                          
19 Sample selection causes bias because ui and εi are correlated. Heckman (1979) showed that the 
sample selection bias can be analyzed as a form of omitted variable bias, where the omitted 
variable λ is the inverse mills ratio obtained from the participation equation.  
20  For example, when we estimated our sample selection correction models using the state 
unemployment rate as our exogenous predictor, we obtained different, and less stable, results. 
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the key element is that the methods we apply are consistent across the four data points. This 
maximizes comparability over time and increases confidence that our estimates may be capturing 
changes over time.     
Although the primary question of interest in this analysis is the size of the family gap and 
whether and how it is has changed over time for women overall and for specific groups, we 
would also like to know what factors might explain the gap and changes in it over time. 
Researchers in this area (drawing in particular on the work of Gary Becker, 1981, 1985) have 
emphasized three possible (and not mutually exclusive) types of explanations. First, mothers and 
non-mothers may differ in terms of their human capital. In addition to differences that may 
precede and be associated with the selection into motherhood, there are likely to be differences 
that arise subsequent to, and as a result of, motherhood. Chief among these would be reductions 
in work experience and job-specific tenure, switches into part-time jobs, and reductions in effort 
or motivation. Second, mothers and non-mothers may work in different types of jobs, with 
mothers more likely to be concentrated in more family-friendly occupations or industries. Third, 
employers may discriminate against mothers, assuming or perceiving them to be less dedicated 
or career-focused. 
We cannot observe employer discrimination in the CPS. Nor can we observe actual work 
experience, job-specific tenure, or work effort. We can however examine the role played by part-
time work, as well as occupation and industry. We do so, in an additional set of models, by 
augmenting our regressions with controls for part-time work (defined in the CPS as less than 35 
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hours per week) as well as controls for occupation (seven categories; reference “professional and 
technical”) and industry (nine categories; reference “agriculture, forestry and fishing”).21  
3. Results 
 
Figure 1 about here: half page 
 
Figure 1 displays the mean wages of mothers and non-mothers in our four annual samples 
(full descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix A). It is apparent that in the earliest years – 
                                                          
21 We have used the following selection strategy in the IPTW selection models for results 
controlling for part-time/occupation/industry (Table 2), as well as for results by race/ethnicity 
(Table 3), education (Table 4), and marital status (Table 5).  First, if we can find a selection 
model that provides strong balance across all covariates consistently for each year in a given 
panel, then we have preferred that selection model. If we have more than one such consistent 
selection model for a given panel, we have selected the one with the best fit, based on AIC and 
BIC fit statistics. Second, if there is no such consistent well-balanced model, we have used the 
best fitting one among the well-balanced ones for each year, and each panel. Finally, if there is 
no selection model that provides full balance across all covariates for a given year, and given 
panel, then we have used the one that gives the least mean bias for that year and panel. We have 
drawn upon the statistical literature on IPTW to design this system of choosing selection models 
but note that the literature does not prioritize one step over the other (Stephen Cole and Miguel 
Hernan 2008; Stephen Morgan and Jennifer Todd 2008; Peter Austin 2011). (Balance Statistics 
pertaining to Tables 2-5 and Appendix C available upon request)  
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1977 and 1987 - mothers have lower average wages than non-mothers (Fig 1) but the pattern is 
different in the later years – mothers nearly reach parity with non-mothers in 1997, and the 
difference seems negligible in 2007. But of course, these descriptive statistics do not tell us how 
earnings compare holding constant differences in characteristics between the groups. 
 
Table 1 about here: full page  
 
Table 1 shows results from our regression models controlling for selection into 
motherhood (Models 1-2) and selection into employment (Model 3). Results from Model 1 (OLS 
models with controls for age, age squared, educational attainment, marital status, and 
race/ethnicity) indicate a significant penalty to motherhood in each year. Comparing the OLS 
results across years, it appears the motherhood penalty has declined over the last four decades -- 
it is significantly lower in both 1997 and 2007 than it was in 1977 (Table 1).22   
 Results from our preferred model, Model 2 (IPTW), are similar in magnitude and suggest 
that there is nothing inherently different in the observed characteristics of mothers that explain 
their lower wages compared to non-mothers. We however do not see a significant decline in the 
overall motherhood penalty in our preferred models, such that for prime working age women as a 
                                                          
22 The table notes indicate in which years coefficients are significantly different from those for 
1977. We conduct Wald tests for equality of coefficients across models; to implement it in Stata, 
we use a ‘seemingly unrelated estimation technique’, which allows us to stack together two models 
and compare the coefficients as if they were estimates of the same model.  
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whole, the motherhood penalty is no smaller in 2007 than in 1977. Mothers continue to earn on 
average about 5-6% less than women without children.  
 In Model 3 (Heckman correction), we turn our attention to selection into employment. 
There are three noteworthy results here. First, in all years, the penalty to motherhood becomes 
slightly more negative, confirming that failure to account for selection into employment leads to 
biased estimates. Second, consistent with this, the selection correction term, lambda, is 
statistically significant and positive in most models (indicating that the error terms in the 
selection equation and the main regression equations are positively correlated), suggesting that it 
is the women who face the smallest wage penalties who are most likely to be employed. Third, 
although they yield slightly more negative estimates, the Heckman results are consistent with the 
IPTW results in terms of the trend over time, again indicating that the motherhood penalties in 
2007 are no smaller than in 1977.  
 So, the most striking result in Table 1 -- across both selection corrected models – is the 
apparent stability in the family gap over time, culminating in a significant motherhood penalty in 
2007 that we is not significantly different from the penalty in 1977. 23 
 
Table 2 about here: half page 
                                                          
23 We also find that the motherhood penalty increased significantly between 1977 and 1987 –
from 6% to 11% in models that correct for selection into motherhood, and from 9.5% to 16% in 
models that correct for selection into employment; when we test the 1987 coefficient versus 
those of the last two years, we find a significant decline in the penalty from the exceptionally 




As discussed, we are not able to explore all the possible explanations for the family gap 
and change or lack of change over time, but we can examine the role of part-time work, 
occupation, and industry, and whether that has changed over time. Accordingly, in Table 2, we 
present estimates from augmented OLS and IPTW models, to which we have added controls for 
part-time, occupation, and industry.24 We find, as expected, that the direct effect of motherhood 
is slightly lower when we control for part-time (since a portion of mothers’ lower average wages 
is accounted for by their higher propensity to work in lower-paid part-time jobs), but this pattern 
is seen in each year of our data and does not seem to be changing over time. Subsequently 
controlling for occupation and for industry decreases the motherhood penalty in most of our 
preferred models as expected, and helps explain some of the family gap. However, after 
including part-time, occupation, and industry, the pattern over time in the family gap remains 
similar to what we observed in our main models – resulting in a similar overall motherhood 
penalty in 2007 and 1977. 
Finally, we would like to know to what extent the family gap varies across groups and 
whether that variation has changed over time. We therefore repeat our main models (OLS and 
IPTW) for sub-groups defined first by race/ethnicity (Table 3), then by education (Table 4), and 
then by marital status (Table 5).  
 
Table 3 about here; half page 
                                                          
24 We do not include Heckman models here because those would have to account not just for 




With regard to race/ethnicity, the results for non-Hispanic white women mirror the results 
for the overall sample; we find persistent significant negative penalties around 5.5-7.5% for non-
Hispanic White women (although with a sharp increase to 13.5% in 1987). For non-Hispanic 
Black women, we find a similar persistent negative penalty of 7.6-8% (but a sharp increase to 
12.8% in 1997). In contrast, among Hispanic women, there was no significant wage penalty in 
any year except 1997, when there is a significant 4.6% penalty to motherhood.  
 
Table 4 about here; half page 
 
As discussed earlier, previous research has obtained mixed results as to how motherhood 
penalties vary by education level. In our results, the only group exempt from motherhood 
penalties is the lowest education group (those with less than high school education). We find 
significant penalties for all other education groups and little clear evidence of a difference in 
magnitude between groups, except those with only a high school diploma who show a significant 
decline in the penalty over time. For college graduates, we find significant penalties in all years 
except 1977.  
 
Table 5 about here; half page 
 
Finally, results by marital status provide evidence that motherhood penalties have fallen 
significantly over time for married mothers. Penalties for previously married mothers do not 
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reveal a similar decline over time; and those for never married mothers rose sharply in the 1980s 
and 1990s.   
4. Supplementary Estimates 
 We carried out several supplementary sets of analyses to test the robustness of our results 
(Appendix C). First, we re-estimated our main models for different age groups -- expanding the 
sample to include younger workers (adding those age 18-24) or older workers (adding those age 
45-55) or both. Second, we re-estimated our main models including workers who were self-
employed. These changes slightly altered the point estimates of the effects of motherhood, but 
they did not alter the main findings regarding trends over time.  
5. Discussion and Conclusions   
  This paper had a modest goal – to re-visit the family gap in pay in the U.S. and 
determine whether it has changed over time. Using comparable data from the March CPS and 
contemporary methods to control for bias associated with selection into motherhood and 
employment, we find that for prime working age women as a whole, the family gap is no smaller 
in 2007 than it was in 1977. Holding constant differences in demographic and human capital 
characteristics, in our preferred IPTW models, women with children earn on average about 5-6% 
less than women without children in both years.  
However, this overall story masks considerable heterogeneity in the size of the gap, and 
trends in the gap, by race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Both non-Hispanic White and 
Non-Hispanic Black mothers have always received lower wages than otherwise comparable non-
mothers, but the wage penalty reached its highest level in 1987 and 1997 respectively for these 
groups; Hispanic mothers historically did not face a motherhood penalty although we do find 
evidence of a penalty in 1997.  
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 We also find divergence in motherhood wage penalties by education level. We find 
significant wage penalties to motherhood among women with a high school or more education, 
but not for those with less than a high school education. In future work, sample sizes permitting, 
it would be useful to examine differences by education level within race/ethnic groups since 
variation by the two sets of factors may be confounded.  
Finally, we see heterogeneity in the motherhood wage penalties by marital status. For 
married women, the significant negative penalties to motherhood in the earlier decades are 
generally smaller in the most recent data. We find the opposite scenario for never-married 
women.  
 We were not able to take into account some key factors including women’s work 
experience, job tenure, work effort, and motivation, and the role that changes in these factors 
may have played in the changing family gap.  This is an important topic for future research. 
Although work effort and motivation are difficult to measure in large datasets, analyses using 
longitudinal data could shed light on the role that changes in work experience and job tenure 
have played. 
While we cannot formally test explanations for what we find in terms of both change and 
lack of change in the family gap over time, we can posit a few possible explanations. First, there 
has been a change in women’s labor force attachment patterns over the last few decades, with 
mothers returning to work sooner after childbirth now than they did in the 1970s. Among women 
with a first birth, only 22% were working 3 months after birth and about 40% were working 12 
months after birth in 1976-80; these proportions increased to 44% and 64% respectively in 2005-
07 (Lynda Laughlin 2011). Inasmuch as employment continuity as well as work experience are 
critical to wages, married mothers’ increased labor force attachment should help explain the 
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narrowing of the family wage gap for that group. However, the most dramatic decreases in 
women’s time away from the labor force following a first birth took place in the 1980s with only 
a very gradual progression afterwards, whereas in our analysis, the significant fall in the wage 
gap for married mothers occurs in the 1990s. This pattern in the data suggests that changes in 
labor force attachment post-birth may not have played a large role in reducing the family gap for 
this group, or perhaps did so with a lag.  
 Second, changes in men’s roles could help explain the declining family gap for married 
women. Even though parenting has become more intensive, with both mothers and fathers 
spending more time in childrearing than they did in earlier decades, the increase for fathers has 
been greater, with fathers almost tripling their time in child care activities between 1965-85 and 
2003-08 (Suzanne Bianchi 2011; Kim Parker and Wendy Wang 2013). Moreover, mothers’ time 
in household work has declined sharply over time with a corresponding increase in father’s 
household work time (Parker and Wang 2013). These shifts in the patterns of child rearing and 
household work might have helped close the wage gap between mothers and non-mothers by 
enabling mothers to conserve the effort that they would have earlier expended on non-market 
work. In addition, fathers’ greater involvement in child care and household work may have 
facilitated mothers’ increased labor force participation (Sara Raley, Suzanne Bianchi, and 
Wendy Wang 2012). Our results for married mothers are consistent with this explanation: when 
we restrict our analyses to married women only (Table 5), we find that the wage gap between 
mothers and non-mothers narrowed substantially from 8-9% in the 1970s and 1980s to 3% in the 
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1990s and 2000s, which roughly corresponds with the period when men’s child care and 
household work involvement was increasing.25 
 Third, changes in the composition of the workforce could affect trends in the family gap.  
In particular, the 1996 federal welfare reform (following earlier federal and state reforms that 
begin in the late 1980s and early 1990s) pushed low income single mothers into the labor market 
in large numbers. If those newly entering the labor market had lower skills than the women who 
worked prior to welfare reform, this change in the composition of the workforce could have led 
to an increase in the family gap in the 1990s. We find some evidence of this in our results for 
Black and Hispanic women (who are more likely than non-Hispanic white women to be low 
income) (Table 3), and further evidence when we estimate our models separately for never 
married women (who are most likely to be affected by welfare policy) (Table 5).26  
Finally, policies to help mothers reconcile work and family have been surprisingly rigid 
in the U.S. over the past few decades.  The U.S. is the only developed country without any 
national paid leave policy or child care provision. Cross-national research shows that 
                                                          
25 It is important to note that selection into marriage has changed, and the presence of a father, 
whether or not they are married, might affect the motherhood wage gap. In future work, it would 
be useful to explore differences between married, cohabiting, and non-partnered mothers.   
26 Another possibly relevant change in the composition of the workforce is the increase in highly 
skilled women opting out of the labor market in the 2000s. However, according to Heather 
Boushey (2008), this trend has been primarily driven by the weak economy and has affected both 
non-mothers and mothers, suggesting that it is not likely to explain changes in the wage gap 
between mothers and non-mothers. 
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motherhood wage penalties are likely to be relatively lower in countries with stronger work-
family reconciliation policies (Janet Gornick and Marcia Meyers 2003; Joya Misra, Michelle 
Budig, and Stephanie Moller 2007; Joya Misra, Michelle Budig, and Irene Boeckman 2011).27 
There is also research showing that a moderate duration of paid parental leave has a positive 
effect on women’s wages (Christopher Ruhm 1998), and that  mothers who had leave coverage 
and used it to take leave and return to work received a premium almost large enough to offset the 
penalty from having a child (Jane Waldfogel 1998b).On the other hand, researchers testing the 
effect of the Family and Medical Leave Act (1994) – which provides only an unpaid leave of 12 
weeks to eligible mothers in the US – have found no such positive wage effect (Jane Waldfogel 
1999; Charles Baum II 2003). Given the importance of continued labor force attachment and 
better job matches on mothers’ wages, the lack of strong work-family policies could explain to a 
large extent why the motherhood penalty has remained relatively stable in the U.S. over time.  
Thus, it appears likely that many factors may help explain the recent changes and lack of 
changes in the family gap, and that the relevant factors may vary depending on the group 
considered. For married women, their own increased labor force attachment, but also changes in 
                                                          
27 However, the specific bundle and design of such policies are likely to matter, as cross-national 
research finds family wage gaps in both the U.S. and the Nordic countries (Wendy Sigle-Rushton 
and Jane Waldfogel, 2007). In unpublished work, Michelle Budig, Joya Misra, and Irene 
Boeckman (2012) test the relationship of the motherhood penalty to specific policies in a cross 
national context. They find publicly available child care for 0-3 year olds as well as for children 
above age 3 to be associated with lower motherhood penalties; they also find a curvilinear 
relationship of the wage penalty with the duration of paid parental leave.   
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their husbands’ behavior, seem to be relevant, while for unmarried women, the dramatic change 
in welfare policies in recent decades may be particularly consequential.  Of concern, these 
changes appear to work in opposite directions, leading to reduced family gaps for married 
mothers but continued or possibly increased gaps for unmarried ones. If so, we may be entering a 
period of diminished inequality between mothers and non-mothers, but potentially increased 
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Table1: Coefficients from Regression of Ln hourly wages (2011$) on family, demographic and education variables for women aged 25-44  

























Mother -0.086*** -0.062*** -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.109***c -0.160***b -0.057***c -0.064*** -0.085*** -0.047***b -0.053*** -0.068*** 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age 0.062*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.070*** 0.082*** 0.072*** 0.079*** 0.090*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.081*** 0.076*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) 
Age2/1000 -0.840*** -0.707*** -0.001*** -0.873*** -1.040*** -0.001*** -0.955*** -1.091*** -0.001*** -0.916*** -0.992*** -0.001*** 
 (0.147) (0.234) (0.000) (0.134) (0.217) (0.000) (0.152) (0.187) (0.000) (0.132) (0.166) (0.000) 
High School  0.207*** 0.228*** 0.213*** 0.233*** 0.246*** 0.324*** 0.261*** 0.260*** 0.345*** 0.249*** 0.269*** 0.315*** 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.027) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) 
Some College 0.335*** 0.318*** 0.342*** 0.431*** 0.458*** 0.543*** 0.442*** 0.454*** 0.543*** 0.422*** 0.439*** 0.514*** 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.026) (0.018) (0.021) (0.031) (0.016) (0.020) (0.026) 
College Graduate 0.526*** 0.584*** 0.537*** 0.663*** 0.656*** 0.789*** 0.779*** 0.784*** 0.902*** 0.815*** 0.821*** 0.916*** 
 (0.014) (0.027) (0.022) (0.015) (0.021) (0.028) (0.018) (0.022) (0.036) (0.017) (0.021) (0.027) 
Previously Married 0.014 0.030** 0.021 -0.034*** -0.033*** 0.003 -0.067*** -0.073*** -0.037* -0.078*** -0.067*** -0.036* 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) 
Never Married 0.012 0.085* 0.016 -0.030** -0.072*** -0.018 -0.064*** -0.082*** -0.044** -0.048*** -0.056*** -0.015 
 (0.015) (0.050) (0.016) (0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
Non-Hispanic Black  0.010 -0.037 0.014 -0.043*** -0.042** -0.030* -0.021 0.003 -0.009 -0.011 -0.017 -0.003 
 (0.014) (0.024) (0.015) (0.013) (0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) 
Hispanic -0.006 -0.040** -0.006 -0.045*** -0.070*** -0.057*** -0.070*** -0.069*** -0.085*** -0.067*** -0.075*** -0.074*** 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
Constant 1.345*** 1.505*** 1.335*** 1.042*** 0.832*** 0.828*** 0.778*** 0.568** 0.610** 0.892*** 0.774*** 0.690*** 
 (0.167) (0.276) (0.168) (0.154) (0.261) (0.166) (0.180) (0.222) (0.191) (0.158) (0.197) (0.167) 
Lambda   0.031   0.308***   0.277***   0.252*** 
   (0.048)   (0.057)   (0.068)   (0.053) 
N 12,599 12,599 21,105 18,089 18,089 25,535 14,993 14,993 20,763 21,384 21,384 29,831 
R-squared 0.127 0.148  0.170 0.169  0.199 0.206  0.214 0.211  
Standard errors in parentheses, robust standard errors in IPTW models; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two tailed tests); a b c d denote whether the coefficient 
on “Mother” is significantly different from 1977 in later years at p<0.001, p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively. IPTW Selection Models are the best fitting 
models among fully balanced models for each year; 1978: mother = f (age, age_sq, education, marital status, race, age_sq*race interactions, marital*education 
interactions); 1988: mother = f(age, age_sq, education, marital status, race, marital*education interactions); 1998 and 2008: mother = f(age, age_sq, education, 
marital status, race, marital*education*race two-way and three-way interactions)   
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Table 2: Coefficients from regression of Ln_hourly wages (2011$) on mother from OLS and IPTW models with 
controls for Part-time, Occupation, and Industry  
 
 1977 1987 1997 2007 
 OLS IPTW OLS IPTW OLS IPTW OLS IPTW 
Baseline         
Mother -0.086*** -0.062*** -0.095*** -0.109***c -0.057***c -0.064*** -0.047***b -0.053*** 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) 
+ Part Time        
Mother -0.079*** -0.048** -0.073*** -0.083*** -0.046***c -0.053*** -0.036***b -0.035** 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) 
+Part Time 
+Occupation 
       
Mother -0.080*** -0.039* -0.073*** -0.079***c -0.046***c -0.050*** -0.035***a -0.034** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) 
+Part Time 
+Occupation  
+ Industry  
       
Mother -0.069*** -0.038* -0.071*** -0.079*** c -0.042***d -0.051*** -0.036***c -0.035*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) 
         
N 12,599 12,599 18,089 18,089 14,993 14,993 21,384 21,384 
Standard errors in parentheses, robust standard errors in IPTW models; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two 
tailed tests); a b c d denote whether the coefficient on “Mother” is significantly different from 1977 in later years at 
p<0.001, p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively; All models include the usual covariates – age, age_squared, and 
dummies for education, race/ethnicity, and marital status. The first panel “Baseline” reports the main coefficients 
from Table 1 for ease of comparison. 
Details about selection models pertaining to IPTW regressions – In the second panel “+ Part Time”, selection 
models for the 1978 and 1988 samples are moderately balanced models with the least mean bias while selection 
models for 1998 and 2008 are the best fitting ones amongst fully balanced models. 1978 and 1988: mother = f(age, 
age_sq, education, marital status, parttime, race, age_sq*race, marital*education, parttime*education); 1998 and 
2008: mother = f(age, age_sq, education, marital status, race, parttime, marital*education*race two-way and three-
way interactions, parttime*marital) ; In the second panel “+Part Time + Occupation” and third panel “+Part Time 
+ Occupation” , the following selection models provides strong balance in 2008 and moderate balance in the earlier 
years. 1978 and 1988: mother = f(age, age_sq, education, marital status, parttime, occupation dummies, industry 
dummies, race, age_sq*race, marital*education, parttime*education); 1998 and 2008 mother = f(age, age_sq, 
education, marital status, race, parttime, occupation dummies, industry dummies, marital*education*race two-way 





Table 3: Coefficients from regression of Ln_hourly wages (2011$) on mother from OLS and IPTW models, by 
Race/Ethnicity 
 
 1977 1987 1997 2007 
 OLS IPTW OLS IPTW OLS IPTW OLS IPTW 
        
Non-Hispanic White        
Mother -0.100*** -0.075*** -0.107*** -0.135***c -0.049***b -0.058*** -0.047***a -0.055*** 
 (0.012) (0.019) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) 
N 9,802 9,802 14,365 14,365 11,093 11,093 15,273 15,273 
        
Non-Hispanic Black        
Mother -0.089*** -0.081*** -0.077*** -0.081*** -0.132*** -0.128*** -0.073*** -0.076*** 
 (0.012) (0.019) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) 
N 1,412 1,412 1,920 1,920 1,630 1,630 2,578 2,578 
         
Hispanic          
Mother 0.018 0.014 0.010 0.003 -0.041 -0.046* -0.038* -0.034 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) (0.031) (0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.025) 
N 1,385 1,356 1,804 1,804 2,270 2,270 3,533 3,533 
Standard errors in parentheses, robust standard errors in IPTW models; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two 
tailed tests); a b c d denote whether the coefficient on “Mother” is significantly different from 1977 in later years at 
p<0.001, p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively; All models include the usual covariates – age, age_squared, and 
dummies for education, race/ethnicity, and marital status. 
Details about selection models pertaining to IPTW regressions – selection models are the following fully balanced 
models that are consistent across all four years in the given panel; Non-Hispanic White: mother =f(age, age_sq, 
education, marital, age*age_sq*education*marital all two-way, three-way and four-way interactions); Non-
Hispanic Black: mother =f(age, age_sq, education, marital, education*marital); Hispanic: mother =f(age, age_sq, 







Table 4: Coefficients from regression of Ln_hourly wages (2011$) on mother from OLS and IPTW models, by 
Education 
 
 1977 1987 1997 2007 
 OLS IPTW OLS IPTW OLS IPTW OLS IPTW 
        
Less than High School        
Mother -0.020 -0.009 -0.020 -0.027 -0.004 -0.010 -0.032 -0.002 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.036) (0.035) (0.030) (0.037) 
N 2,168 2,168 1,725 1,725 1,258 1,258 1,545 1,545 
        
High School Diploma        
Mother -0.125*** -0.115*** -0.108*** -0.105*** -0.063***b -0.051*** b -0.035**a -0.038**b 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
N 5,544 5,544 7,583 7,583 4,703 4,703 5,388 5,388 
        
Some College         
Mother -0.102*** -0.121*** -0.114*** -0.117*** -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.083*** -0.074*** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) 
N 2,298 2,298 4,209 4,209 4,618 4,618 6,701 6,701 
        
College Graduate        
Mother -0.083*** 0.026 -0.117*** -0.179***a -0.034 -0.050* -0.055*** -0.061*** 
 (0.022) (0.054) (0.019) (0.031) (0.021) (0.027) (0.018) (0.020) 
N 2,589 2,589 4,572 4,572 4,414 4,414 7,750 7,750 
Standard errors in parentheses, robust standard errors in IPTW models; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two 
tailed tests); a b c d denote whether the coefficient on “Mother” is significantly different from 1977 in later years at 
p<0.001, p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively; All models include the usual covariates – age, age_squared, and 
dummies for education, race/ethnicity, and marital status.  
Details about selection models pertaining to IPTW regressions – Less than High School: selection model is the best 
fitting one amongst the fully balanced selection models that are consistent across all four years, mother = f (age, 
age_sq, marital, race, age_sq*race marital*race); High School Diploma: selection models are the best fitting models 
amongst fully balanced models for each year; 1978: mother =f (age, age_sq, race, marital, age*race*marital all 
interactions); 1988, 1998, and 2008: mother=f(age, age_sq, race, marital, race*marital); Some College: selection 
models are the best fitting models amongst the fully balanced ones for each year; 1978: mother =f(age, age_sq, race, 
marital, age*age_sq*race two-way and three way interactions); 1988: mother =f(age, age_sq, race, marital, 
age_sq*marital, age*age_sq*race two-way and three way interactions); 1998: mother =f(age, age_sq, race, marital, 
marital*age_sq*race two-way and three way interactions); 2008: mother =f(age, age_sq, race, marital, , native, 
region, marital*age_sq*race two-way and three way interactions); College Graduate: selection model for 1978 is 
the one showing least mean bias amongst the models with only one or two covariates not balanced, mother = f (age, 
age_sq, race, marital, age*marital, age*race); selection model for each of 1988, 1998, and 2008 is the best fitting 
model amongst fully balanced ones for the given year; 1988: mother = f(age, age_sq, race, marital, race*marital, 
age*race, ace_sq*race, age_cube, age_cube*race, age*marital, age_sq*marital, age_cube*marital); 1998:mother = 
f(age, age_sq, race, marital, age*marital*race all up to three-way interactions) ; 2008: mother = f(age, age_sq, race, 







Table 5: Coefficients from regression of Ln_hourly wages (2011$) on mother from OLS and IPTW models, by 
Marital Status 
 
 1977 1987 1997 2007 
 OLS IPTW OLS IPTW OLS IPTW OLS IPTW 
Married         
Mother -0.075*** -0.081*** -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.030**c -0.034**c -0.027**b -0.027**b 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
N 8,687 8,687 11,572 11,572 9,121 9,121 12,647 12,647 
         
Previously 
Married 
        
Mother -0.091*** -0.092*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.019c -0.021c -0.068*** -0.073*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
N 2,333 2,333 3,356 3,356 2,657 2,657 3,615 3,615 
         
Never 
Married  
        
Mother -0.096** 0.056 -0.125*** -0.209***b -0.184***d -0.182***c -0.087*** -0.105***d 
 (0.041) (0.091) (0.027) (0.044) (0.024) (0.032) (0.018) (0.023) 
N 1,579 1,579 3,161 3,161 3,215 3,215 5,122 5,122 
Standard errors in parentheses, robust standard errors in IPTW models; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two 
tailed tests); a b c d denote whether the coefficient on “Mother” is significantly different from 1977 in later years at 
p<0.001, p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively; All models include the usual covariates – age, age_squared, and 
dummies for education, race/ethnicity, and marital status.  
Details about selection models pertaining to IPTW regressions – selection model for both Married and Previously 
Married is the following fully balanced model that is consistent across all years, mother = f (age, age_sq, race, 
education, education*race). Never Married: selection model for 1978 is the one that shows least mean bias amongst 
moderately balanced selection models, mother = f (age, age_sq, race, education, age*education, age_cube, age*race, 
age_sq*race, region, region*race); 1988: mother = f (age, age_sq, education, race, age*education). Selection models 
for 1998 and 2008 in the Never Married panel are the best fitting ones amongst fully balanced models: mother = f 
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Appendix A: Percentage of women aged 25-44 employed and in the wage sample in 1977, 1987, 1997, 2007.  
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Employed = reporting >0 weeks worked last year  
Employed and in the wage sample = Employed – (unpaid family workers + self-employed + reporting wages<45% 




Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics of the four samples of women in 1977, 1987, 1997, and 2007 
  
 1977 1987 1999 2007 
 Mother Non-Mother Mother Non-Mother Mother Non-Mother Mother Non-Mother 
         
Age 33.874       31.780       34.361       32.962       35.290       33.877       35.657       33.578       
 (0.059) (0.096) (0.050) (0.073) (0.055) (0.083) (0.045) (0.075) 
Hourly Wages ($) 4.322       4.801       8.415       9.267       13.620       14.115       19.592       19.609       
 (0.041) (0.046) (0.077) (0.067) (0.816) (0.363) (0.303) (0.260) 
Hourly Wages (2011$) 16.044       17.822       16.662       18.348       19.081       19.775       21.258       21.275       
 (0.151) (0.172) (0.153) (0.132) (1.143) (0.508) (0.328) (0.282) 
Hours Worked 34.090       38.661       35.010       39.458       35.983       39.913       36.606       39.659       
 (0.122) (0.125) (0.104) (0.104) (0.111) (0.125) (0.086) (0.111) 
Weeks Worked 38.987       45.852       42.944       47.606       45.016       47.843       46.533       48.685       
 (0.179) (0.186) (0.140) (0.122) (0.136) (0.135) (0.098) (0.109) 
Annual Wages ($) 5,803.182       8,594.243       13,024.270       17,921.586       21,091.336       26,463.294       32,649.337       37,457.690       
 (49.044) (75.911) (96.995) (137.390) (221.870) (317.125) (292.258) (410.651) 
Annual Wages (2011 $) 21,541.412       31,901.831       25,788.055       35,484.740       29,548.962       37,075.075       35,424.532       40,641.595       
 (182.051) (281.780) (192.050) (272.031) (310.839) (444.293) (317.100) (445.556) 
Full time (%) 69.5 87.8 70.3 87.3 73.4 86.7 75.7 87 
Part time (%)  30.5 12.2 29.7 12.7 26.6 13.3 24.3 13 
Education (%)         
Less than High School 19.9 11.7 11.1 7.0 9.7 6.3 8.0 5.7 
High School Diploma 48.2 35.5 46.1 35.2 34.7 25.8 26.3 22.9 
Some College 17.3 20.2 22.9 23.9 31.8 29.2 33.0 27.9 
College Graduate 14.7 32.6 19.8 33.9 23.8 38.8 32.7 43.5 
Marital Status (%)         
Married 79.7 47.0 77.6 42.5 73.9 39.1 71.1 34.7 
Previously Married 18.5 18.5 18.1 19.2 17.5 18.1 17.2 16.3 
Never Married 1.8 34.5 4.3 38.3 8.6 42.7 11.7 49 
Race/Ethnicity (%)         
White Non-Hispanic 76.2 81.0 77.8 81.9 71.9 77.4 72.3 69.7 
Black Non-Hispanic 11.8 10.1 11.2 9.7 11.4 10.0 11.0 14.1 
Hispanic 12.0 8.9 10.9 8.4 16.7 12.6 16.7 16.1 
         





Appendix C: Supplementary Analysis 
Coefficients from regression of Ln_hourly wages (2011$) on mother from OLS and IPTW models after the 
inclusion of younger women, older women, or both 
 
 1977 1987 1997 2007 
 OLS IPTW OLS IPTW OLS IPTW OLS IPTW 
Including Younger 
Women (Age: 18-44) 
       
Mother -0.086*** -0.053* -0.094*** -0.113***d -0.055***c -0.072*** -0.043***a -0.059*** 
 (0.009) (0.023) (0.008) (0.024) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) 
N 19,652 19,613 24,261 24,261 19,092 19,092 27,259 27,259 
        
Including Older Women 
(Age: 25-54) 
       
Mother -0.073*** -0.065*** -0.093*** d -0.103***b -0.046*** d -0.063*** -0.040***b -0.049*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) 
N 17,121 17,121 23,110 23,110 21,063 21,063 32,243 32,243 
        
Including both younger 
and older women 
(Age: 18-54) 
       
Mother -0.078*** -0.050** -0.093*** -0.103***c -0.046***b -0.074*** -0.037***a -0.054*** 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) 
N 24,174 24,134 29,282 29,282 25,162 25,162 38,118 38,118 
Standard errors in parentheses, robust standard errors in IPTW models; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two 
tailed tests); a b c d denote whether the coefficient on “Mother” is significantly different from 1977 in later years at 
p<0.001, p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively; All models include the usual covariates – age, age_squared, and 
dummies for education, race/ethnicity, and marital status.  
Details about selection models pertaining to IPTW regressions – Including younger women: selection model is the 
following moderately balanced model that is consistent across all years: mother = f (age, age_sq, race, education, 
marital status, age_sq* race*education*marital status two-way, three-way, and four-way interactions). Including 
older women: selection models for 1978-1998 are those with least mean bias amongst moderately balanced models; 
1978 and 1988 : mother=f(age, age_sq, race, education, marital status, age*age_sq* race* *marital status two-way, 
three-way, and four-way interactions), 1998: mother = (age, age_sq, race, education, marital status, 
age*age_sq*education, age*age_sq*marital,  race*marital*education, all two-way and three way interactions); 
selection model for 2008 is the best fitting one amongst fully balanced models: mother = f (age, age_sq, race, 
education, marital status , age*age_sq*education*marital two-way, three-way, and four-way interactions). 
Including both younger and older women: selection models for all years are the ones showing least mean bias 
amongst moderately balanced models. 1978 and 1988: mother = f(age, age_sq, race, education, marital status, 
age*race*age_sq marital*education*race all two-way and three way interactions), 1998: mother = f(age, age_sq, 
race, education, marital status, race*marital marital*education, age*age_sq*education age*age_sq*marital 
age*age_sq*race two-way and three way interactions), 2008: mother = f(age, age_sq, race, education, marital status, 
age*age_sq*education*marital two-way, three-way, and four-way interactions).  
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                 Unmatched |       Mean               %reduct |     t-test 
Variable           Matched | Treated Control    %bias  |bias| |    t    p>|t| 
---------------------------+----------------------------------+---------------- 
age                     U  | 33.874    31.78     36.1         |  19.41  0.000 
                        M  | 33.229   33.242     -0.2    99.4 |  -0.18  0.858 
                           |                                  | 
age_sq                  U  | 1.1771   1.0478     32.6         |  17.52  0.000 
                        M  | 1.1387   1.1392     -0.1    99.6 |  -0.09  0.925 
                           |                                  | 
2.race                  U  | .11754   .10087      5.3         |   2.79  0.005 
                        M  | .13286   .14185     -2.9    46.1 |  -2.08  0.038 
                           |                                  | 
3.race                  U  | .12026   .08878     10.3         |   5.31  0.000 
                        M  | .10796   .10633      0.5    94.8 |   0.42  0.674 
                           |                                  | 
2.race#c.age_sq         U  | .13484   .11294      5.8         |   3.02  0.003 
                        M  | .15093   .15948     -2.3    60.9 |  -1.64  0.100 
                           |                                  | 
3.race#c.age_sq         U  | .13628   .09628     11.0         |   5.66  0.000 
                        M  | .12188   .11935      0.7    93.7 |   0.54  0.587 
                           |                                  | 
2.marital               U  | .18523   .18505      0.0         |   0.02  0.980 
                        M  | .18708   .18828     -0.3  -558.2 |  -0.24  0.807 
                           |                                  | 
3.marital               U  | .01819    .3447    -93.5         | -58.63  0.000 
                        M  | .12482   .12413      0.2    99.8 |   0.17  0.868 
                           |                                  | 
2.education             U  | .48151    .3551     25.8         |  13.52  0.000 
                        M  | .44256   .44211      0.1    99.6 |   0.07  0.943 
                           |                                  | 
3.education             U  | .17271   .20223     -7.6         |  -4.03  0.000 
                        M  | .17828   .17847     -0.0    99.3 |  -0.04  0.968 
                           |                                  | 
4.education             U  | .14684   .32559    -43.0         | -23.83  0.000 
                        M  |  .2049   .19982      1.2    97.2 |   1.01  0.314 
                           |                                  | 
2.marital#2.education   U  | .08706   .07644      3.9         |   2.02  0.043 
                        M  | .08452   .08471     -0.1    98.1 |  -0.06  0.955 
                           |                                  | 
2.marital#3.education   U  | .03745   .04064     -1.6         |  -0.87  0.382 
                        M  | .03858   .03854      0.0    98.5 |   0.02  0.985 
                           |                                  | 
2.marital#4.education   U  | .01855   .03822    -11.9         |  -6.65  0.000 
                        M  | .02513   .02493      0.1    99.0 |   0.10  0.918 
                           |                                  | 
3.marital#2.education   U  | .00839   .10619    -43.0         | -26.89  0.000 
                        M  | .04112   .03999      0.5    98.8 |   0.46  0.649 
                           |                                  | 
3.marital#3.education   U  | .00284   .07523    -38.0         | -24.26  0.000 
                        M  | .02325   .02628     -1.6    95.8 |  -1.55  0.121 
                           |                                  | 
3.marital#4.education   U  | .00095   .13909    -56.2         | -36.43  0.000 
                        M  | .04799   .04594      0.8    98.5 |   0.77  0.442 





         Summary of the distribution of the abs(bias) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                       BEFORE MATCHING 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%     .0469858       .0469858 
 5%     .0469858       1.646946 
10%     1.646946       3.878355       Obs                  17 
25%     5.801821       5.346767       Sum of Wgt.          17 
 
50%       11.866                      Mean           25.05004 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      24.91049 
75%     38.04592       43.04309 
90%     56.22976       43.04445       Variance       620.5327 
95%     93.51765       56.22976       Skewness       1.252666 
99%     93.51765       93.51765       Kurtosis       4.236589 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                       AFTER MATCHING 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%     .0240071       .0240071 
 5%     .0240071       .0496413 
10%     .0496413       .0722107       Obs                  17 
25%     .1201714       .0920279       Sum of Wgt.          17 
 
50%     .3092701                      Mean           .6908748 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .8410618 
75%     .8327212       1.225399 
90%     2.266788       1.591881       Variance       .7073849 
95%     2.882761       2.266788       Skewness       1.479461 




 Sample  | Pseudo R2    LR chi2    p>chi2    MeanBias    MedBias 
---------+------------------------------------------------------- 
 Raw     |    0.245     3904.16    0.000       25.1       11.9 









                 Unmatched |       Mean               %reduct |     t-test 
Variable           Matched | Treated Control    %bias  |bias| |    t    p>|t| 
---------------------------+----------------------------------+---------------- 
age                     U  | 34.361   32.962     24.6         |  16.38  0.000 
                        M  | 33.856   33.906     -0.9    96.4 |  -0.83  0.409 
                           |                                  | 
age_sq                  U  | 1.2081   1.1239     21.6         |  14.36  0.000 
                        M  | 1.1798   1.1821     -0.6    97.3 |  -0.55  0.582 
                           |                                  | 
_Irace_2                U  | .11216   .09664      5.1         |   3.30  0.001 
                        M  | .12967   .13207     -0.8    84.5 |  -0.68  0.497 
                           |                                  | 
_Irace_3                U  | .10946   .08438      8.5         |   5.49  0.000 
                        M  | .10002   .09866      0.5    94.6 |   0.43  0.667 
                           |                                  | 
2.marital               U  | .18134   .19213     -2.8         |  -1.82  0.069 
                        M  | .18734   .18758     -0.1    97.7 |  -0.06  0.953 
                           |                                  | 
3.marital               U  | .04272   .38312    -91.4         | -65.30  0.000 
                        M  | .17481   .17331      0.4    99.6 |   0.38  0.706 
                           |                                  | 
2.education             U  | .46148   .35248     22.3         |  14.56  0.000 
                        M  | .41907   .42255     -0.7    96.8 |  -0.67  0.502 
                           |                                  | 
3.education             U  | .22884   .23874     -2.3         |  -1.53  0.125 
                        M  | .23039   .23037      0.0    99.8 |   0.00  0.997 
                           |                                  | 
4.education             U  | .19832   .33865    -32.1         | -21.43  0.000 
                        M  | .25495   .25131      0.8    97.4 |   0.80  0.426 
                           |                                  | 
2.marital#2.education   U  | .08724   .08025      2.5         |   1.65  0.099 
                        M  | .08524    .0862     -0.3    86.2 |  -0.33  0.743 
                           |                                  | 
2.marital#3.education   U  | .04163   .05188     -4.9         |  -3.22  0.001 
                        M  | .04573   .04558      0.1    98.5 |   0.07  0.944 
                           |                                  | 
2.marital#4.education   U  | .02583   .03877     -7.3         |  -4.91  0.000 
                        M  | .03182   .03142      0.2    96.9 |   0.22  0.826 
                           |                                  | 
3.marital#2.education   U  | .02321   .11517    -36.8         | -26.08  0.000 
                        M  |  .0583   .05819      0.0    99.9 |   0.04  0.966 
                           |                                  | 
3.marital#3.education   U  | .00822   .08623    -37.4         | -27.11  0.000 
                        M  |  .0367   .03809     -0.7    98.2 |  -0.70  0.482 
                           |                                  | 
3.marital#4.education   U  |  .0037   .16249    -60.1         | -44.35  0.000 
                        M  |  .0674   .06492      0.9    98.4 |   0.95  0.342 
                           |                                  | 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Summary of the distribution of the abs(bias) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                       BEFORE MATCHING 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%     2.337951       2.337951 
 5%     2.337951       2.524986 
10%     2.524986       2.768965       Obs                  15 




50%     21.55187                      Mean           23.97475 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      25.19909 
75%      36.8428        36.8428 
90%      60.0588       37.41349       Variance       634.9942 
95%     91.42471        60.0588       Skewness       1.419974 
99%     91.42471       91.42471       Kurtosis       4.457688 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                       AFTER MATCHING 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%      .004515        .004515 
 5%      .004515       .0418332 
10%     .0418332       .0623197       Obs                  15 
25%     .0732117       .0732117       Sum of Wgt.          15 
 
50%     .4577725                      Mean             .46768 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .3302295 
75%     .7862964       .7862964 
90%     .8753136       .8298718       Variance       .1090515 
95%     .9379176       .8753136       Skewness      -.0903845 




 Sample  | Pseudo R2    LR chi2    p>chi2    MeanBias    MedBias 
---------+------------------------------------------------------- 
 Raw     |    0.206     4975.80    0.000       24.0       21.6 









                         Unmatched |       Mean               %reduct |     t-te 
> st 




age                             U  |  35.29   33.877     24.5         |  14.82   
> 0.000 
                                M  | 34.674   34.752     -1.3    94.5 |  -1.16   
> 0.246 
                                   |                                  | 
age                             U  |  35.29   33.877     24.5         |  14.82   
> 0.000 
                                M  | 34.674   34.752     -1.3    94.5 |  -1.16   
> 0.246 
                                   |                                  | 
age_sq                          U  | 1.2734   1.1863     21.8         |  13.15   
> 0.000 
                                M  | 1.2358   1.2411     -1.3    93.9 |  -1.15   
> 0.252 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race                          U  | .11375   .10037      4.3         |   2.55   
> 0.011 
                                M  | .10883   .11017     -0.4    90.0 |  -0.37   
> 0.711 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race                          U  | .16677   .12591     11.6         |   6.77   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .15134    .1523     -0.3    97.6 |  -0.23   
> 0.816 
                                   |                                  | 
2.marital                       U  | .17468   .18142     -1.8         |  -1.05   
> 0.296 
                                M  | .17667   .17947     -0.7    58.5 |  -0.63   
> 0.527 
                                   |                                  | 
3.marital                       U  | .08606   .42738    -84.9         | -53.89   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .22212   .21837      0.9    98.9 |   0.78   
> 0.433 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#2.marital                U  | .02662   .02181      3.1         |   1.83   
> 0.067 
                                M  | .02449   .02463     -0.1    97.1 |  -0.08   
> 0.939 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#3.marital                U  |  .0372   .05391     -8.0         |  -4.86   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .04421   .04468     -0.2    97.2 |  -0.20   
> 0.842 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#2.marital                U  | .03464   .02447      6.0         |   3.49   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .03062    .0312     -0.3    94.2 |  -0.29   
> 0.769 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#3.marital                U  | .01614   .05622    -21.6         | -13.75   
> 0.000 




                                   |                                  | 
2.education                     U  | .34723   .25802     19.5         |  11.45   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .31428   .31288      0.3    98.4 |   0.26   
> 0.794 
                                   |                                  | 
3.education                     U  | .31783   .29172      5.7         |   3.36   
> 0.001 
                                M  |  .3092   .30699      0.5    91.6 |   0.41   
> 0.679 
                                   |                                  | 
4.education                     U  | .23819   .38766    -32.7         | -19.70   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .29287   .29485     -0.4    98.7 |  -0.38   
> 0.707 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#2.education              U  | .04362   .03298      5.5         |   3.23   
> 0.001 
                                M  | .03965   .04018     -0.3    94.9 |  -0.24   
> 0.812 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#3.education              U  | .04212   .03334      4.6         |   2.70   
> 0.007 
                                M  | .03862    .0393     -0.4    92.3 |  -0.30   
> 0.761 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#4.education              U  | .01775   .02713     -6.3         |  -3.86   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .02169   .02183     -0.1    98.5 |  -0.08   
> 0.935 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#2.education              U  | .05388   .03316     10.2         |   5.87   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .04608   .04645     -0.2    98.2 |  -0.15   
> 0.878 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#3.education              U  | .04319   .03369      4.9         |   2.89   
> 0.004 
                                M  | .03995   .03995      0.0    99.9 |   0.00   
> 0.998 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#4.education              U  | .02074   .03334     -7.8         |  -4.75   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .02541   .02526      0.1    98.9 |   0.08   
> 0.937 
                                   |                                  | 
2.marital#2.education           U  | .06457   .06455      0.0         |   0.01   
> 0.996 
                                M  | .06411   .06532     -0.5 -5681.0 |  -0.42   
> 0.671 
                                   |                                  | 
2.marital#3.education           U  | .06254   .05941      1.3         |   0.77   
> 0.439 
                                M  | .06098   .06189     -0.4    71.0 |  -0.33   
> 0.743 
                                   |                                  | 
2.marital#4.education           U  | .02437   .04185     -9.8         |  -5.99   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .03137   .03176     -0.2    97.8 |  -0.19   
> 0.848 
                                   |                                  | 




                                M  | .05671    .0551      0.7    97.1 |   0.61   
> 0.542 
                                   |                                  | 
3.marital#3.education           U  | .03154   .12343    -34.9         | -22.30   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .06989    .0675      0.9    97.4 |   0.82   
> 0.413 
                                   |                                  | 
3.marital#4.education           U  | .01005   .19418    -63.8         | -42.82   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .07984   .08009     -0.1    99.9 |  -0.08   
> 0.936 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#2.marital#2.education    U  | .01026   .00798      2.4         |   1.40   
> 0.161 
                                M  | .00933   .00949     -0.2    93.0 |  -0.14   
> 0.886 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#2.marital#3.education    U  |  .0108   .00745      3.5         |   2.04   
> 0.041 
                                M  | .00941   .00937      0.0    98.7 |   0.04   
> 0.968 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#2.marital#4.education    U  | .00278   .00426     -2.5         |  -1.52   
> 0.129 
                                M  | .00326   .00333     -0.1    95.4 |  -0.10   
> 0.917 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#3.marital#2.education    U  | .01507   .01844     -2.6         |  -1.58   
> 0.115 
                                M  | .01656   .01691     -0.3    89.5 |  -0.24   
> 0.812 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#3.marital#3.education    U  | .01422   .01773     -2.8         |  -1.69   
> 0.092 
                                M  | .01558     .016     -0.3    87.9 |  -0.29   
> 0.768 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#3.marital#4.education    U  | .00385   .01561    -12.0         |  -7.71   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .00877   .00844      0.3    97.2 |   0.31   
> 0.759 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#2.marital#2.education    U  | .00973   .00904      0.7         |   0.42   
> 0.675 
                                M  |  .0095    .0098     -0.3    56.4 |  -0.26   
> 0.792 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#2.marital#3.education    U  | .01016    .0055      5.3         |   3.03   
> 0.002 
                                M  |  .0083   .00837     -0.1    98.6 |  -0.06   
> 0.950 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#2.marital#4.education    U  | .00342   .00443     -1.6         |  -0.98   
> 0.329 
                                M  | .00376   .00382     -0.1    94.4 |  -0.08   
> 0.936 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#3.marital#2.education    U  | .00545   .01365     -8.4         |  -5.29   
> 0.000 




                                   |                                  | 
3.race#3.marital#3.education    U  |  .0046   .01596    -11.3         |  -7.20   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .00949   .00914      0.3    96.9 |   0.31   
> 0.753 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#3.marital#4.education    U  |  .0015   .01685    -16.2         | -10.76   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .00748   .00734      0.1    99.1 |   0.14   
> 0.889 




         Summary of the distribution of the abs(bias) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                       BEFORE MATCHING 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%     .0084854       .0084854 
 5%     .7096108       .7096108 
10%     1.618651       1.309013       Obs                  38 
25%     3.127459       1.618651       Sum of Wgt.          38 
 
50%     7.056611                      Mean            13.4619 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      17.30577 
75%     19.50909       32.66015 
90%     32.66015       34.88589       Variance       299.4897 
95%     63.82684       63.82684       Skewness       2.600443 
99%     84.87646       84.87646       Kurtosis         10.236 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                       AFTER MATCHING 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%     .0031268       .0031268 
 5%     .0033124       .0033124 
10%      .075324       .0466948       Obs                  38 
25%     .1158445        .075324       Sum of Wgt.          38 
 
50%     .2935859                      Mean           .3813295 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .3611293 
75%      .432776        .933759 
90%      .933759       1.325409       Variance       .1304144 
95%     1.343716       1.343716       Skewness       1.538519 




 Sample  | Pseudo R2    LR chi2    p>chi2    MeanBias    MedBias 
---------+------------------------------------------------------- 
 Raw     |    0.188     3742.52    0.000       13.5        7.1 










                         Unmatched |       Mean               %reduct |     t-te 
> st 




age                             U  | 35.657   33.578     35.5         |  25.07   
> 0.000 
                                M  | 34.967   34.901      1.1    96.8 |   1.18   
> 0.237 
                                   |                                  | 
age                             U  | 35.657   33.578     35.5         |  25.07   
> 0.000 
                                M  | 34.967   34.901      1.1    96.8 |   1.18   
> 0.237 
                                   |                                  | 
age_sq                          U  | 1.3003   1.1673     32.7         |  23.01   
> 0.000 
                                M  |  1.256    1.252      1.0    97.0 |   1.03   
> 0.303 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race                          U  | .11034   .14143     -9.4         |  -6.57   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .12154   .12216     -0.2    98.0 |  -0.19   
> 0.846 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race                          U  | .16704    .1615      1.5         |   1.02   
> 0.305 
                                M  | .16498   .16752     -0.7    54.1 |  -0.71   
> 0.480 
                                   |                                  | 
2.marital                       U  | .17205   .16292      2.4         |   1.67   
> 0.094 
                                M  | .16983   .17085     -0.3    88.8 |  -0.28   
> 0.779 
                                   |                                  | 
3.marital                       U  | .11682   .49018    -88.9         | -65.91   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .23874   .24222     -0.8    99.1 |  -0.84   
> 0.400 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#2.marital                U  | .02396   .02775     -2.4         |  -1.66   
> 0.097 
                                M  | .02541    .0254      0.0    99.7 |   0.01   
> 0.994 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#3.marital                U  | .04249   .08566    -17.7         | -12.87   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .05733   .05771     -0.2    99.1 |  -0.17   
> 0.868 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#2.marital                U  | .03448   .02575      5.1         |   3.43   
> 0.001 
                                M  | .03184   .03232     -0.3    94.4 |  -0.28   
> 0.776 
                                   |                                  | 




                                M  | .04395   .04493     -0.4    98.4 |  -0.49   
> 0.623 
                                   |                                  | 
2.education                     U  | .26317   .22908      7.9         |   5.40   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .25412   .25466     -0.1    98.4 |  -0.13   
> 0.898 
                                   |                                  | 
3.education                     U  | .32997   .27945     11.0         |   7.49   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .31526   .31485      0.1    99.2 |   0.09   
> 0.928 
                                   |                                  | 
4.education                     U  | .32704   .43469    -22.3         | -15.47   
> 0.000 
                                M  |  .3579   .35782      0.0    99.9 |   0.02   
> 0.985 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#2.education              U  | .03671   .03813     -0.8         |  -0.52   
> 0.605 
                                M  | .03767   .03773     -0.0    95.5 |  -0.03   
> 0.973 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#3.education              U  | .04152    .0471     -2.7         |  -1.88   
> 0.060 
                                M  | .04374     .044     -0.1    95.4 |  -0.13   
> 0.896 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#4.education              U  | .02361   .04824    -13.3         |  -9.67   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .03173   .03198     -0.1    99.0 |  -0.15   
> 0.881 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#2.education              U  |  .0496   .04525      2.0         |   1.39   
> 0.163 
                                M  | .04856   .04932     -0.4    82.6 |  -0.36   
> 0.717 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#3.education              U  | .04458   .04297      0.8         |   0.54   
> 0.590 
                                M  | .04432   .04487     -0.3    65.7 |  -0.28   
> 0.782 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#4.education              U  | .02563    .0488    -12.3         |  -8.89   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .03219   .03322     -0.5    95.6 |  -0.60   
> 0.550 
                                   |                                  | 
2.marital#2.education           U  | .05259    .0498      1.3         |   0.87   
> 0.387 
                                M  | .05219   .05295     -0.3    72.7 |  -0.35   
> 0.725 
                                   |                                  | 
2.marital#3.education           U  |  .0675   .05507      5.2         |   3.51   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .06349   .06336      0.1    99.0 |   0.05   
> 0.957 
                                   |                                  | 
2.marital#4.education           U  | .03385   .04425     -5.4         |  -3.77   
> 0.000 
                                M  |  .0374   .03778     -0.2    96.3 |  -0.21   
> 0.835 
                                   |                                  | 
52 
 
3.marital#2.education           U  | .04402   .09789    -21.1         | -15.46   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .06299   .06279      0.1    99.6 |   0.09   
> 0.931 
                                   |                                  | 
3.marital#3.education           U  | .04347   .13219    -31.7         | -23.79   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .07401    .0736      0.1    99.5 |   0.16   
> 0.869 
                                   |                                  | 
3.marital#4.education           U  |   .014   .23463    -70.9         | -57.99   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .08277   .08688     -1.3    98.1 |  -1.52   
> 0.128 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#2.marital#2.education    U  | .00669   .00868     -2.3         |  -1.60   
> 0.109 
                                M  | .00752   .00762     -0.1    94.8 |  -0.12   
> 0.902 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#2.marital#3.education    U  | .00996   .01024     -0.3         |  -0.20   
> 0.845 
                                M  | .01002   .00987      0.1    47.6 |   0.15   
> 0.877 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#2.marital#4.education    U  | .00557   .00669     -1.4         |  -1.00   
> 0.319 
                                M  | .00598   .00603     -0.1    95.5 |  -0.07   
> 0.946 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#3.marital#2.education    U  | .01748   .02262     -3.7         |  -2.57   
> 0.010 
                                M  | .01947   .01961     -0.1    97.4 |  -0.10   
> 0.922 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#3.marital#3.education    U  | .01609   .02675     -7.4         |  -5.29   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .01994   .02003     -0.1    99.1 |  -0.07   
> 0.944 
                                   |                                  | 
2.race#3.marital#4.education    U  | .00425   .03201    -20.9         | -16.71   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .01335   .01347     -0.1    99.6 |  -0.11   
> 0.915 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#2.marital#2.education    U  | .01108   .00768      3.5         |   2.35   
> 0.019 
                                M  | .01009   .01042     -0.3    90.4 |  -0.33   
> 0.739 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#2.marital#3.education    U  | .00982   .00697      3.1         |   2.09   
> 0.037 
                                M  | .00894   .00907     -0.1    95.5 |  -0.14   
> 0.889 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#2.marital#4.education    U  |   .003   .00583     -4.3         |  -3.12   
> 0.002 
                                M  | .00395   .00398     -0.0    99.0 |  -0.05   
> 0.962 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#3.marital#2.education    U  | .00822    .0239    -12.5         |  -9.40   
> 0.000 




                                   |                                  | 
3.race#3.marital#3.education    U  | .00759    .0222    -12.1         |  -9.08   
> 0.000 
                                M  | .01249   .01245      0.0    99.7 |   0.03   
> 0.972 
                                   |                                  | 
3.race#3.marital#4.education    U  | .00216    .0276    -21.1         | -17.25   
> 0.000 
                                M  |  .0095   .01053     -0.9    96.0 |  -1.07   
> 0.286 




         Summary of the distribution of the abs(bias) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                       BEFORE MATCHING 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%     .2837173       .2837173 
 5%     .7501513       .7501513 
10%      1.26606         .78673       Obs                  38 
25%     2.446093        1.26606       Sum of Wgt.          38 
 
50%     7.642407                      Mean           14.70794 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      18.94461 
75%     21.09646       35.48853 
90%     35.48853       35.48853       Variance       358.8984 
95%     70.94821       70.94821       Skewness       2.350004 
99%     88.85711       88.85711       Kurtosis       8.887758 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                       AFTER MATCHING 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%     .0069977       .0069977 
 5%      .015915        .015915 
10%     .0306557       .0178048       Obs                  38 
25%     .0792273       .0306557       Sum of Wgt.          38 
 
50%     .1489303                      Mean           .3148394 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .3591833 
75%      .356153       .9905276 
90%     .9905276       1.134696       Variance       .1290127 
95%     1.134696       1.134696       Skewness       1.477275 




 Sample  | Pseudo R2    LR chi2    p>chi2    MeanBias    MedBias 
---------+------------------------------------------------------- 
 Raw     |    0.193     5219.23    0.000       14.7        7.6 
 Matched |    0.000        9.66    1.000        0.3        0.1 
 
